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Notes 
California Charter School Teachers:  
Flexibility in the Classroom,  
Vulnerability as an Employee 
Jennifer Hom Chen* 
Since the passage of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, charter schools have been hailed for 
achieving better results for students compared to traditional public schools in California. In 
particular, charter schools are touted for their ability to serve the needs of low-income 
students in urban areas. Proponents also assert that charter schools present teachers with the 
opportunity to work in a more flexible environment, where they allegedly enjoy greater 
flexibility and control over their instructional and curricular decisions, giving them the 
ability to innovate and experiment with new teaching pedagogy to meet the unique needs of 
their students. However, there is little discussion on the drawbacks that teachers face while 
teaching in this “increased flexibility” employment regime. Specifically, charter school 
teachers are deprived of statutory protections against arbitrary disciplinary decisions. 
 
This Note explores various legal routes that charter school teachers may navigate to protect 
themselves from arbitrary disciplinary and termination decisions. In particular, this Note 
examines various statutory and constitutional sources of protection, at both the state and 
federal level, and concludes that California due process provides the most promising 
opportunity for attaining protection from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. However, several 
unresolved ambiguities within California due process jurisprudence undermine the prospect 
of its ability to effectively shield teachers from uninformed or erroneous disciplinary 
decisions. 
 
This Note’s conclusion provides for an alternative legal framework that would better 
balance charter school teachers’ need to be respected and free from completely arbitrary 
disciplinary actions, with the charter schools’ need to flexibly and efficiently make staffing 
decisions. Indeed, charter schools must be able to swiftly remove teachers who cannot meet 
the needs of their students due to their incompetence, unprofessionalism, or other faults. But 
at the same time, as professional educators and individuals as invested in their students as 
their own careers, charter school teachers should not be subject to the unfettered whim of 
their administrators. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive 
Managing Editor, Hastings Law Journal; B.A., University of California, Berkeley. I am extremely 
grateful for Professor Reuel Schiller, whose unconditional optimism and academic insight gave me the 
inspiration, drive, and motivation to pursue this incredible project. Thank you also to the Volume 67 
and 68 Notes Staff, for their diligence and patience. This Note is dedicated to my parents and 
grandparents, for supporting my intellectual curiosity and love of writing since I was a child.  
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Introduction 
Since the passage of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, charter 
schools have been hailed for achieving better results for students 
compared to traditional public schools in California.1 In particular, 
charter schools are touted for their ability to serve the needs of low-
 
 1. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–04.5 (West 2016); Why Charters Get Results, Cal. Charter Schs. 
Ass’n, http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/results/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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income students in urban areas.2 Proponents claim that the success 
enjoyed by charter schools is attributable to a variety of factors, 
including: (1) greater flexibility in curriculum, budget, and staffing; 
(2) greater ability to implement change to better meet students’ needs; 
(3) increased accountability as they are subject to review and renewal 
every five years; (4) engaged teachers who are empowered to make 
important decisions and experiment with new educational tactics; and 
(5) parents who are invested in working with teachers to advance their 
children’s progress.3 
In addition to being educators, charter school teachers are also 
employees. When the discussion focuses on charter school teachers as 
employees rather than educators, the conversation then hones in on how 
teachers are attracted to charter schools because they “want[] the 
freedom to make their own instructional and curricular decisions, and an 
environment that foster[s] professional opportunities for collaboration 
with like-minded colleagues.”4 Though some drawbacks of teaching at 
charter schools are acknowledged, such as longer hours, “less job 
security,” and high teacher burnout and turnover rates, these discussions 
largely focus on teachers as educators, as opposed to teachers as 
employees.5 Discussions related to the employment practices in charter 
schools are centered around how charter school administrators are not 
bound by the same bureaucratic red tape as school district 
administrators, allowing them greater control and flexibility in hiring 
practices and professional development in order to ensure the best 
outcomes for students.6 However, little attention is given to the other 
side of the coin: the tradeoffs that charter school teachers must bear as a 
result of this “increased flexibility” employment regime. 
This Note explores the various legal routes that charter school 
teachers may navigate to protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary 
and termination decisions. Part I provides a general overview of the legal 
framework shaping the charter school system in California, and discusses 
 
 2. What Should Parents Know About Charter Schools?, NPR (Sept. 15, 2006, 9:00 AM), http://www. 
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6081152 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 3. Why Charters Get Results, supra note 1; see Ctr. For Research on Educ. Outcomes, Charter 
School Performance in California 40 (2014).  
 4. Courtney L. Malloy & Priscilla Wohlstetter, Working Conditions in Charter Schools: What’s the 
Appeal for Teachers?, 35 Educ. & Urb. Soc’y 219, 227–29 (2003); see In Their Own Words: Teachers on 
Working at a Charter, Cal. Charter Schools Ass’n, http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/working/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 5. Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26; Brian Childs, Charter Schools v. Public Schools: The 
Right Choice for Teachers, Certification Map (Oct. 23, 2012), http://certificationmap.com/charter-schools-vs- 
public-schools/; Adolpho Buzman-Lopez, Study: Teacher Turnover Much Higher at LA Charters Than 
Public Schools, 89.3 KPCC (July 19, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/07/19/27792/new-study-finds- 
teacher-turnover-much-higher-chart/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 6. Ron Zimmer & Richard Buddin, Occasional Paper, Making Sense of Charter Schools: 
Evidence from California, Rand Educ. (Rand Corp.) 2006, at 4. 
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the California statutory protections that charter school teachers may 
utilize to challenge arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Part II discusses 
federal statutory and due process protections that charter school teachers 
may utilize as public employees. Part III questions whether California’s 
due process protections may offer charter school teachers any safeguards 
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Finally, Part IV recommends an 
alternative legal framework that better balances the dignity of charter 
school teachers and their needs, with the goals that the charter school 
movement aims to accomplish for the students and families in California. 
I.  California Statutory Protections 
A. Overview of Charter School Regime in California 
The California Charter Schools Act of 1992 created California’s 
charter school system in order to “provide opportunities for teachers, 
parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain 
schools that operate independently from the existing school structure,” in 
order to accomplish a variety of student and family-oriented goals.7 
Namely, the California Legislature established charter schools as an 
alternative, autonomous regime of public schools designed to accomplish 
seven goals: (1) improve student learning; (2) increase student learning 
opportunities for low-achieving students; (3) encourage the use and 
development of different, innovative teaching methods; (4) create new 
professional opportunities for teachers with increased responsibility over 
learning programs; (5) provide parents and students with more choice as 
to the educational opportunities available in the public school system; 
(6) hold the schools accountable for meeting “measurable pupil 
outcomes”; and (7) provide “vigorous competition in the public school 
system to stimulate continual improvements in all public schools.”8 
To give charter schools the broad flexibility necessary to accomplish 
their goals, the legislature granted charter schools a “mega-waiver” from 
nearly all of the statutes in the California Education Code (“Education 
Code”) governing district schools.9 Section 47610 of the Education Code 
provides, “[a] charter school shall comply with this part and all of the 
provisions set forth in its charter, but is otherwise exempt from the laws 
governing school districts, except . . . [a]s specified in Section 47611 
[and] . . . Section 41365[,] [as well as] [a]ll laws establishing minimum age 
for public school attendance.”10 This single sentence in the Education 
 
 7. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–01 (West 2016).  
 8. Id. § 47601.  
 9. See id. § 47610; see also Human Resources and Employment, Cal. Charter Sch. Ass’n, 
http://www.calcharters.org/operating/human-resources/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 10. Educ. §§ 47610–11 (outlining a charter school’s obligations should it choose to offer its 
teachers a retirement plan under the State Teacher’s Retirement system. Section 41635 establishes the 
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Code releases charter schools from the “red tape” allegedly burdening 
normal school districts, giving charter schools the requisite autonomy 
and flexibility to achieve their goals in exchange for direct accountability 
for measured academic results.11 However, charter schools are still 
required to comply with several other laws that apply to district schools, 
such as provisions in the federal and state constitution, as well as federal 
laws governing equal rights, access, and discrimination.12 These other 
bodies of law will be discussed later in Parts II and III of this Note. 
Though the “mega-waiver” provides charter schools with a wealth 
of freedom and autonomy, this provision also renders these schools 
ineligible for the statutory protections that district teachers receive. 
Namely, charter school teachers are not subject to the teacher tenure 
laws that protect district teachers’ job security.13 California public school 
teachers are initially hired on a probationary basis and are eligible to 
become “permanent” employees if they are employed consecutively for 
three years.14 Permanent employees cannot be dismissed except for the 
specific, relatively extreme causes enumerated by section 44932 of the 
Education Code.15 
 
Charter School Revolving Loan Fund and its administration by the California School Finance 
Authority).  
 11. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1. 
 12. Frequently Asked Questions, Nat’l Charter School Res. Ctr., http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/ 
page/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 13. See id. 
 14. Educ. § 44929.23. 
 15. Id. § 44932. That section of the Education Code provides: 
A permanent employee shall not be dismissed except for one or more of the following causes:  
(1) Immoral conduct including, but not limited to, egregious misconduct. For the purposes of 
this chapter, “egregious misconduct” is defined exclusively as immoral conduct that is the basis 
for an offense described in Section 44010 or 44011 of this code, or in Sections 11165.2 to 
11165.6, inclusive, of the Penal Code.  
(2) Unprofessional conduct.  
(3) Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism, as 
prohibited by Chapter 188 of the Statutes of 1919, or in any amendment to that chapter.  
(4) Dishonesty.  
(5) Unsatisfactory performance.  
(6) Evident unfitness for service.  
(7) Physical or mental condition unfitting him or her to instruct or associate with children.  
(8) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable 
regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the state board or by the 
governing board of the school district employing him or her.  
(9) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude.  
(10) Violation of Section 51530 or conduct specified in Section 1028 of the Government Code, 
added by Chapter 1418 of the Statutes of 1947.  
(11) Alcoholism or other drug abuse that makes the employee unfit to instruct or associate 
with children. 
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In addition to enumerating the substantive grounds upon which a 
tenured teacher may be dismissed, the Education Code also establishes a 
complicated set of procedural requirements that must be satisfied in 
order to dismiss or discipline a teacher.16 For example, to initiate the 
dismissal or suspension process, formal written charges that specify the 
“behavior and the acts or omissions constituting the charge[,] . . . the 
statutes and rules that the employee is alleged to have violated, and . . . 
set forth the facts relevant to each charge” must be filed with the 
governing board of the school district.17 Based on the written charges, the 
school board may, upon a majority vote, give the teacher notice that it 
intends to dismiss or suspend him or her at the expiration of thirty days 
from the date of service of the notice, unless the teacher demands a 
hearing to dispute the charges.18 However, the school board may only 
initiate dismissal or suspension proceedings in this manner if a collective 
bargaining agreement has not been adopted pursuant to section 3543.2(b) 
of the Government Code.19 Taken together, these rules make the process 
of suspending or dismissing a teacher cumbersome, costly, and difficult, 
thus giving tenured teachers a significant degree of protection from not 
only arbitrary disciplinary decisions, but possibly meritorious ones as 
well.20 
While there is debate about whether the protections offered to 
district teachers are excessive and possibly detrimental to the profession 
and students,21 none of these statutory provisions apply to charter school 
teachers.22 As discussed earlier, charter school teachers have been 
intentionally and explicitly carved out of these statutory protections in 
order to give charter schools more flexibility to make staff-related 
decisions.23 However, as a result, charter school teachers are deprived of 
the statutory protections that district teachers enjoy, and are therefore 
 
 16. See id. § 44934.  
 17. Id. § 44934(b)–(c).  
 18. Id. § 44934(b).  
 19. Id.  
 20. A challenge to the constitutionality of the teacher tenure laws in California is being litigated by a 
group of nine California students in Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. 
2014). A California superior court judge has held that laws governing the hiring and firing of district 
school teachers served no compelling purpose, and have led to an unfair, nonsensical system which drives 
new, effective teachers from the classroom prematurely while allowing incompetent senior teachers to 
remain in the classroom. California’s teachers unions filed an appeal on September 3, 2014. The 
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision in April 2016. Jennifer Medina & Motoko 
Rich, California Appeals Court Reverses Decision to Overturn Teacher Tenure Rules, Huffington Post (Apr. 
14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/us/californiaappealscourt-reverses-decision-to-overturn- 
teacher-tenure-rules.html.  
 21. See Teacher Tenure Pros and Cons, ProCon.org, http://teachertenure.procon.org/#pro_con 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 22. See Educ. § 47610. 
 23. See Human Resources and Employment, supra note 9.  
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highly vulnerable to a mass of adverse employment decisions that district 
teachers do not experience by virtue of sections 44934 and 44932 of the 
Education Code. The question then remains as to whether charter school 
teachers have any protections at all under California statutesor 
instead, under this framework, are merely subject to the whim of their 
administrators, left to constantly question their job security and their 
ability to make a stable living in a challenging profession. 
B. The Educational Employment Relations Act 
Although the “mega-waiver” carves charter schools out of the vast 
majority of California laws governing school districts,24 some hope still 
remains for charter school teachers in California’s statutory framework. 
Charter schools still fall under the purview of the Educational Employment 
Relations Act, also known as the “Rodda Act,” as established by 
section 47611.5(a) of the Education Code.25 The Rodda Act recognizes that 
all public school employees have a right to unionize and engage in collective 
bargaining.26 Specifically, the Rodda Act acknowledges the right of all public 
school employees to join organizations of their choice, to be represented 
by such organizations in their professional and employment relationships 
with their public school employers, and to have a voice in the 
formulation of educational policy.27 
In accordance with the Rodda Act, the California Charter Schools 
Act requires that the charters of such schools contain a declaration 
asserting whether “the charter school shall be deemed the exclusive 
public school employer of the employees at the charter school for the 
purposes of section 3540.1 of the Government Code.”28 However, 
regardless of whether the charter elects the charter school or the district 
to be the exclusive public employer, the charter school is still subject to 
the obligations of a “Public School Employer” under the Rodda Act.29 
For example, charter schools have a duty to meet and negotiate with 
representatives of employee organizations regarding matters within the 
scope of the representation.30 They also have an obligation not to 
interfere with employee selection or formation of an exclusive 
representative,31 as well as a duty not to retaliate against employees for 
exercising their rights under the Educational Employment Relations 
 
 24. See Educ. § 47610. 
 25. Id. § 47611.5(a).  
 26. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3540 (West 2016).  
 27. See id. §§ 3540, 3543.  
 28. John R. Yeh, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: The Unholy Alliance, Cal. Pub. Emp. Rel. 
J. Online, http://cper.berkeley.edu/journal/online/?p=915 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 29. Id.; Gov’t § 3543.3.  
 30. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.1.  
 31. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.5. 
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Act.32 California courts and the Public Employment Relations Board 
have held charter schools to these obligations, regardless of whether 
their employees have recognized an exclusive representative or not.33 
Thus, although charter school teachers are exempt from the statutory 
protections that district teachers receive, they still possess the right to 
unionize and collectively bargain to improve their conditions of 
employment. Such negotiations could develop substantive and 
procedural requirements with which employers must comply in order to 
dismiss or discipline a charter school teacher. 
While unionization is available to charter school teachers as a tool 
to establish protections from arbitrary disciplinary measures, it is 
unlikely to provide effective or immediate relief. Unions have attempted 
to organize in charter schools in the past but failed.34 As of 2011, only 
twelve percent of California’s charter schools were unionized,35 and today 
unions still struggle to affirmatively implant themselves in charter 
schools.36 
One challenge unions face is that charter school teachers simply 
may not want to join or form unions.37 Teachers at charter schools are 
typically younger than district teachers, and often choose to work 
specifically at charter schools, where they enjoy greater freedom and 
flexibility in the classroom, and as a staff member generally.38 Thus, they 
are unlikely to want to join a union, which many believe only serves to 
create complicated collective bargaining agreements, wrought with red 
tape and restrictive rules.39 To many of these teachers, unions embody 
the bureaucratized, limited work environment that they wanted to avoid 
by joining the charter movement in the first place.40 Another reason that 
unions have struggled to successfully implant themselves in charter 
schools is the difficult nature of organizing the teachers who are spread 
 
 32. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.5. 
 33. Yeh, supra note 28. The Court of Appeal’s decision in California Teachers Ass’n v. Public 
Employment Relations Board, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1076 (2009), is an example of a court imposing the 
provisions of the Rodda Act, such as the duty not to retaliate, on charter schools. Id.  
 34. Larry Sand, Teachers Unions Target Charter Schools in California, Union Watch (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://unionwatch.org/teachers-unions-target-charter-schools-in-california/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 35. Arianna Prothero, Calif. Teachers’ Union is Getting “Serious About Charter School Organizing”, 
Educ. Week (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2014/08/calif_ 
teachers_union_is_getting_serious_about_charter_school_organizing.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 36. See Arianna Prothero, Calif. Teachers’ Union Sets Sights on Charters, Educ. Week (Sept. 10, 
2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/09/05/03charterunions.h34.html (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016); Sand, supra note 34; see also Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and 
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
886, 902 (2006).  
 37. Prothero, supra note 35; Sand, supra note 34. 
 38. Childs, supra note 5; Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26. 
 39. See Sand, supra note 34; see also Malloy & Wholstetter, supra note 4, at 227.  
 40. Sand, supra note 34; Malloy & Wholstetter, supra note 4, at 227. 
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out amongst a network of different campuses within the same system.41 
These campuses are often geographically scattered and have different 
workplace cultures, administrators, policies, schedules, modes of 
operation, and student populations.42 
Despite the challenges unions face in organizing charter school 
teachers and staff, the unionization movement among California’s charter 
schools has recently become more active and prominent.43 In 2013, forty 
out of the 183 charter schools in Los Angeles were unionized.44 
Additionally, in the same year, the National Education Association 
(“NEA”) launched a campaign to unionize charter schools.45 Moreover, in 
January 2015, the California Teachers Association (“CTA”), the NEA’s 
largest state affiliate, officially listed “charter school organizing” as a focus 
area in its long-term strategic plan, after making only slight progress over 
the last few years.46 
In sum, charter school unionization in California is in its early 
stages. Whether unionization will pick up in the charter sector is still 
unclear.47 Though proponents are optimistic, unions still face the 
challenge of unionizing a population of young teachers who favor 
flexibility over bureaucracy, and are scattered across separate local 
campuses within large networks. Considerable debate remains as to 
whether unions will stabilize or weaken the charter movement, garnering 
mixed opinions in the educational community.48 Specifically, “the 
 
 41. For example, Rocketship Education currently has ten schools located across the southern part of 
San Francisco Bay Area in California, with more schools opening in these various areas in the years to come. 
Communities We Serve, Rocketship, http://www.rsed.org/locations.cfm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). Another 
network, Aspire, has numerous schools located throughout both California and Tennessee. California 
Schools, Aspire Pub. Schs., http://aspirepublicschools.org/schools/regions/california-schools/ (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016); Tennessee Schools, Aspire Pub. Schs., http://aspirepublicschools.org/schools/regions/ 
tennessee-schools/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 42. See Sand, supra note 34; see also Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, The Original Charter 
School Vision, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/opinion/sunday/albert-
shanker-the-original-charter-school-visionary.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (discussing how charter schools 
sometimes form “‘thin’ collective bargaining agreements that are tailored to the special needs of individual 
charter schools” but suggesting that charter schools are reacting largely on an individualized basis to the 
changing educational landscape); see also Michelle Ellson, Charter Schools’ Union Gaining National 
Attention, Alamedan (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://thealamedan.org/news/charter-schools-union-
gaining-national-attention (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 43. See Sam Dillon, As Charter Schools Organize, Many Debate Effect, N.Y. Times (July 26, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/education/27charter.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also 
Samantha Winslow, Charter School Teachers Join the Union, Labor Notes (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.labornotes.org/2013/04/charter-school-teachers-join-union (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 44. Tim Walker, NEA Steps Up Organizing Efforts in Non-Union Charter Schools, neaToday 
(July 8, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://neatoday.org/2013/07/08/nea-steps-up-organizing-efforts-in-non-union- 
charter-schools/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Prothero, supra note 35.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Dillon, supra note 43.  
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unionization effort raises questions about whether unions will strengthen 
the charter movement by stabilizing its young, often transient teaching 
force, or weaken it by preventing administrators from firing ineffective 
teachers and imposing changes they say help raise achievement, like an 
extended school year.”49 
Consequently, the road to unionization is an uncertain, long, and 
indirect path to providing charter school teachers with protection and 
relief from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. As a result, unions currently 
are not available as an effective or immediate means of protecting charter 
school teachers. Therefore, consideration must be given to alternative 
avenues for relief. 
II.  Federal Sources of Protection 
A. Federal Statutory Protections from Arbitrary 
Disciplinary Decisions 
As discussed in Part I, the “mega-waiver” does not exempt charter 
schools from their obligations to comply with federal laws pertaining to 
equal rights, access, and discrimination, as well as a variety of other 
federal statutes that cover both public and private employers.50 For 
example, charter schools must still comply with the American Disabilities 
Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title 
IV and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and other similar statutes.51 
These federal statutes offer charter school teachers limited protection 
from arbitrary termination decisions, by precluding administrators from 
basing disciplinary actions on race, gender, age, disability, or medical 
condition.52 However, charter school teachers are still vulnerable to a 
wide swath of other discipline and dismissal decisions, such as those 
based on mistaken facts, or administrator arbitrariness. 
For example, consider two teachers, Teacher A and Teacher B, who 
are both pregnant and take twelve weeks of unpaid medical leave under 
the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Teacher A is fired because 
she spoke out at a staff meeting against the network’s aggressive 
expansion plans because she’s concerned that resources will be spread 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12; see United States Issues Guidance on Obligations of 
Charter Schools to Comply with Federal Civil Rights Laws, U.S. Dept. of Educ. (May 14, 2014), http://www. 
ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-issues-guidance-obligations-charter-schools-comply-
federal-civil-rights-laws (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for 
Civil Rights, to Colleague (May 14, 2014) (on file with U.S. Dept. of Educ.). 
 51. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, supra note 50; Handy 
Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. Dept. of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/ 
compliance/hrg.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Leave Benefits, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol. 
gov/dol/topic/benefits-leave/fmla.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 52. See id.  
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too thin to ensure each school’s proper operation. On the other hand, 
Teacher B is fired for taking leave under the FMLA because the 
principal was annoyed with having to find and pay for a substitute 
teacher for twelve weeks. The FMLA protects Teacher B from 
dismissal,53 but provides no relief to Teacher A who was subject to the 
arbitrary termination decision. Therefore, although these federal statutes 
serve to protect charter school teachers from a limited number of 
termination decisions, such as those based on race, gender, and disability, 
charter school teachers are still vulnerable to a wealth of other arbitrary 
disciplinary decisions. 
B. Federal Due Process as a Mode of Protection 
1. Overview of Federal Due Process and Its Application to Charter 
School Teachers 
California charter schools have been recognized as public school 
employers.54 In the Charter Schools Act of 1992, the legislature specifically 
established charter schools as part of California’s public school system.55 In 
Options for Youth-Victor Valley, Inc., a charter school argued that it was 
subject to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and not to the 
Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) because it was a private, 
non-profit corporation and independent charter school.56 The PERB 
regional director held that because charter schools are accountable to, 
and dependent upon, whichever public body granted them the charter, 
and because the school declared itself the public employer of the school’s 
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, that the school was a 
public employer, subject to all of the statutory obligations.57 
As public employers, charter schools also fall under the purview of 
the U.S. Constitution, and can be found liable if their actions violate an 
employee’s constitutional rights.58 The First and Fourth Amendments, 
among others, may offer limited relief to charter school teachers that are 
fired for exercising their rights under those particular amendments. 
However, charter school teachers remain vulnerable to a wide range of 
other disciplinary decisions that do not relate directly to those 
amendments, such as those based on administrative error or odious 
administrator motives. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment is most 
 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (West 2016).  
 54. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 36, at 929.  
 55. See Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136 (Ct. App. 1999).  
 56. Options for Youth-Victor Valley, Inc., 27 Pub. Emp. Rep. Cal. 104 (2003).  
 57. Id.; see Malin & Kerchner, supra note 36, at 929.  
 58. James F. Allmendinger, et al., The First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment Constitutional Rights of 
Public EmployeesFree Speech, Due Process and Other Issues, Am. Bar Ass’n 1 (2009), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2009/ac2009/151.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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relevant for the present discussion, because the Due Process Clause may 
provide a path that charter school teachers could use to protect 
themselves from a broader range of disciplinary decisions. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”59 Due 
process is triggered by a governmental deprivation of property.60 
“Property” has been defined broadly to include not only physical 
property, but also entitlements provided by state law or custom.61 Once 
federal due process is triggered, an individual is entitled to some degree 
of procedure before being effectively deprived of his or her property or 
liberty.62 
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court 
clarified the nature of the process due to a public employee upon his 
termination, when that employee had a constitutionally recognized 
property interest in his or her job.63 In Loudermill, the petitioner worked 
as a security guard for the Cleveland Board of Education. On his job 
application, he stated that he had never been convicted of a felony.64 
Later, as part of a routine examination of Loudermill’s employment 
records, the Board discovered that he had previously been convicted of 
grand larceny.65 The Board provided Loudermill with written notice that 
he was going to be dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling out his 
employment application.66 Loudermill did not have the opportunity to 
respond to these charges or otherwise challenge his dismissal.67 He was 
ultimately fired, and challenged the Board’s termination procedures on 
the grounds that they violated his right to procedural due process.68 
In evaluating whether the government’s expeditious termination 
violated the employee’s right to due process, the Court weighed the 
employee’s private interests in maintaining employment, having notice of 
 
 59. U.S. Const. amend. V.  
 60. Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication 
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1067, 1084–85 (1991–1992). 
 61. Id. at 1085.  
 62. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary 
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is 
notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties in the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1990) (“[The requirements of] the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . are complied with, provided that in the proceedings which 
are claimed not to have been due process of law, the person condemned has had sufficient notice, and 
adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend.”).  
 63. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–46 (1985).  
 64. Id. at 535.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 536. 
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his charges, and having an opportunity to present his side of his case, 
against the government’s interest in immediate termination in order to 
ensure smooth bureaucratic operations.69 The Court concluded that the 
government’s interest did not outweigh the employee’s interests, and that 
“affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination 
would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable 
delays.”70 
The Court held that due process in the employment context requires 
the government to provide the public employee with both “notice [of the 
charges against him] and an opportunity to respond.”71 The opportunity to 
respond allows employees to state their side of the case and provide 
reasons, either in-person or in writing, as to why they should not be 
subjected to the proposed act of discipline or dismissal.72 The Court 
highlighted that these procedures “need not be elaborate[d].”73 According 
to the Court, requiring more than notice and an opportunity to respond 
would constitute an unfair intrusion upon the government’s interest in 
efficient removal of a dissatisfactory employee.74 These basic procedures 
serve as an “initial check against mistaken decisions,” to ensure that 
there is a reasonable basis to believe that the charges against the 
employee are true, and to justify the proposed disciplinary action or 
termination.75 
In Loudermill, the Court established procedures that defined the 
baseline fundamental due process requirements that public employers 
must comply with in terminating employees.76 With this precedent in mind, 
the federal Due Process Clause may provide charter school teachers with a 
means of protecting themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. If 
charter school teachers could trigger the federal Due Process Clause by 
establishing that they have a property interest in their continued 
employment, administrators would be required to provide them notice and 
an opportunity to be heard before disciplining or terminating them. 
This procedural requirement may consequently serve to protect 
some charter school teachers from arbitrary termination decisions by 
requiring administrators and teachers to engage in a dialogue before 
reaching a decision. The process may clear up mistaken termination 
decisions. Such a dialogue and potential paper trail may also force 
administrators to carefully reason through a decision to dismiss or 
 
 69. Id. at. 543–44. 
 70. Id. at 544.  
 71. Id. at 546.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 545–46.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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discipline a teacher, because administrators would be precluded from 
flatly terminating teachers without an explanation. 
For example, consider the following hypothetical: Ms. Apple is a 
charter school teacher with stellar test results. Assuming the Due Process 
Clause applies, the administration would be required to give her 
reasonable notice of her termination and an opportunity to be heard, 
before terminating her from her position.77 In compliance with the 
requirements of due process, her principal calls her into his office for a 
meeting. After he informs her that she is being fired, Ms. Apple asks 
why. The principal explains that her test scores were below standard, and 
that the school has decided it would be better if they hired another, more 
experienced teacher. Ms. Apple looks at the test scores that the principal 
has referred to, and notices a mistakethe principal has confused her 
test scores with Ms. Applebaum’s. She points out the mistake, the 
principal realizes that he almost fired the wrong teacher, and reassures 
Ms. Apple that she is not being terminated. This is an example of a 
situation where a teacher who is provided notice and an opportunity to 
be heard may be able to utilize this forum to avoid being subjected to an 
arbitrary, or in this case mistaken, disciplinary action. 
It is important to note, however, that due process will not always 
protect teachers from arbitrary termination decisions, as is discussed in 
Subpart II.B. The foregoing example is simply meant to illustrate that it 
is possible for federal and state due process to protect at least some 
teachers from arbitrary or mistaken termination decisions. Regardless, 
the efficacy of the federal Due Process Clause first hinges on whether 
federal due process can be triggered in the first place. 
2. Would Federal Due Process Be Triggered If a Charter School 
Teacher Is Fired or Disciplined? 
The Supreme Court has recognized that public school teachers may 
have an “entitlement” or “property interest” within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to retain their positions via statute or contract.78 
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Supreme Court established that “[t]o 
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it.”79 The Court qualified that property interests stem not 
from the federal Constitution, but from independent sources, such as 
 
 77. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  
 78. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–
603 (1972).  
 79. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.  
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state law.80 In applying these principles, the Court highlighted the fact 
that the petitioner, Professor Roth, had signed an employment contract 
that only guaranteed his employment up to a certain date; the contract 
did not provide any promises or guarantees of continued employment 
after the expiration of his one-year employment term.81 Because no state 
statute or university rule secured Roth’s interest in re-employment, the 
Court held that Professor Roth therefore had “no possible claim of 
entitlement to re-employment.”82 Thus, due to the nature of Professor 
Roth’s employment contract, he did not have a right to due process, as 
he had not shown he had been deprived of a property interest.83 
Similarly, in Perry v. Sindermann, the Court acknowledged that “[a] 
person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process 
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that 
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at 
a hearing.”84 However, unlike the Roth case, the Court concluded that 
Professor Sindermann established that a de facto tenure program existed 
at his school, sufficient to give him a legitimate expectation of job 
security, and to in turn create an “entitlement” to his continued 
employment.85 Specifically, Professor Sindermann cited a provision in his 
college’s faculty guide, as well as guidelines promulgated by the 
Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System, which 
suggested that a teacher employed for more than seven years had some 
form of job tenure.86 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Professor 
Sindermann had “alleged the existence of rules and understandings, 
promulgated and fostered by state officials . . . [to] justify his legitimate 
claim of entitlement to continued employment absent ‘sufficient 
cause.’”87 
In accordance with Roth and Sindermann, California charter school 
teachers must demonstrate that they have a property interest or 
entitlement to their continued employment under California’s statutory 
framework or contract law in order to trigger federal due process 
protections. The Charter Schools Act of 1992 does not provide charter 
school teachers with any guarantees of employment, or impose any 
obligations with regard to their hiring, dismissal, or disciplinary 
practices.88 In fact, through the “mega-waiver,” the California statutory 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 578.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).  
 85. Id. at 600–02.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 602–03.  
 88. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–64 (West 2016).  
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scheme purposefully exempts charter school teachers from the statutes 
that would likely provide district teachers an “entitlement” to their 
employment within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.89 
Because charter school teachers cannot establish entitlement by 
pointing at the California charter school statutory framework, contract 
law is the only other alternative. Whether a teacher has a property 
interest in his or her continued employment depends on the terms of 
each teacher’s individual contract.90 Generally, charter school teachers’ 
terms and conditions of employment are established either through 
individual employee contracts, employee policies, or handbooks. Charter 
school teachers in California are commonly hired at will.91 As such, they 
can be fired at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, 
provided that they are not fired for illegal reasons, such as race, gender, 
religion, etc.92 This makes sense in light of the purpose of charter schools: 
to establish an independent network of public schools that have 
increased flexibility to make decisions as necessary to best serve their 
students.93 The ability to terminate a teacher without any red-tape 
certainly serves that interest. 
Because California charter schools expressly hire teachers on an at 
will basis, a substantial percentage of charter school teachers are unable 
to establish a property interest in their continued employment for the 
purposes of triggering the federal Due Process Clause. Most charter 
school teachers face a situation similar to Professor Roth’s. As previously 
discussed, Professor Roth’s employment contract did not provide any 
guarantee of employment beyond a certain date.94 Consequently, 
although he had a property interest in his employment during the 
duration of his contract, after it expired he did not have any property 
interest in his future employment sufficient to trigger federal due 
 
 89. See id. § 47610. 
 90. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972).  
 91. See John R. Yeh, Perspective: Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Implications for 
Authorizing Agencies, Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass’n (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.csba.org/Newsroom/CA 
SchoolsMagazine/2011/Winter/Departments/Perspective_Winter2011.aspx; see, e.g., Employee Handbook 
2012, Aspire Pub. Schools, Nat’l Council on Tech. Quality, http://www.nctq.org/docs/revised 
_final_copy_10_3_2012.pdf (“All employment at Aspire is ‘At-Will’.[sic]”); Human Resources, Livermore 
Valley Charter School, http://lvcs.org/about/human-resources (“All LVCS staff are hired on an ‘at-will’ 
annual basis, including teachers, aides, custodians, office staff, and administration.”); Sherman Thomas 
Charter Sch., Employee Handbook 3 (2007–2008); (“The School is an at-will employer.”); Trillium 
Charter School: A California Public Charter School, 9 Trillium Charter School, http://trilliumcharter. 
weebly.com/uploads/1/1/3/2/11327995/trillium-mission.pdf (Trillium Charter School Employees are 
employed at will). 
 92. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2922 (West 2016); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal. 
2000) (“An at-will employment may be ended by either party ‘at any time without cause,’ for any or 
no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of notice.”). 
 93. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.  
 94. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).  
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process.95 Charter school teachers are even worse off than Professor 
Roth. Unlike him, they have absolutely no guarantee of job security, 
because their employment is terminable at any time, and need not be 
justified by a good reason. Therefore, charter school teachers, expressly 
hired at will, are unlikely to have a property interest in their continued 
employment. Therefore, they are unable to invoke the federal Due 
Process Clause when they are subjected to arbitrary discipline unless 
they can characterize their employment relationship as something other 
than at will. 
Once a charter school teacher signs an employment contract with an 
express at will provision, it is difficult for them to later argue that their 
employee-employer relationship ought to be characterized differently. 
For example, in accordance with the parol evidence rule, a written, fully 
integrated employment contract, with an unambiguous, express, at will 
provision cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence of an earlier 
implied agreement to terminate only for cause.96 
The consequences of the parol evidence rule’s negative impact is 
best illustrated through the following hypothetical: A prospective charter 
school teacher is meeting with her soon-to-be principal, who has just 
orally offered her a position at his school. The teacher asks about job 
security. The principal responds, “We hope all of our teachers will stick 
around long-term and develop professions here; we don’t want our 
school to just be another rung on a ladder that they are climbing. You 
will probably only get fired if your test scores are not up to standard, or 
some other good reason.” The teacher is later given an employment 
contract during her prep period and is told that she needs to sign it by the 
end of the day. The contract contains an express, unambiguous, at will 
clause. Being a young, inexperienced professional, overwhelmed with the 
rigors of working at a charter school, she glosses over the clause and 
signs the document. She is later fired because she critiqued the charter 
school network’s expansion plan at a staff meeting. This teacher is not 
able to establish she had a property interest in her future employment 
despite the principal’s oral assurances, and would be precluded from 
arguing that the principal’s statements contradict the explicit at will 
provision in her contract.97 
An alternative method through which charter school teachers may 
attempt to establish that their employment relationship is not at will is by 
arguing that the contract has been modified since its execution, such that 
the at will provision no longer governs.98 An express at will employment 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. See Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 60–61 (Cal. 2006).  
 97. See id.  
 98. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1698 (West 2016).  
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agreement can be modified by a subsequent express agreement to re-
define the employment relationship as something other than at will.99 
However, vague promises are insufficient to alter the at will nature of the 
employment relationship,100 and the modification must be supported by 
new consideration.101 Thus, in order to effect a modification, a charter 
school teacher must be told clearly and unambiguously that the terms of 
his/her employment are being modified such that the relationship is no 
longer at will, and that in return, the charter school teacher must give 
extra consideration. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is low, 
given that administrators have an incentive to preserve the at will nature 
of the relationship in order to possess the flexibility necessary to 
accomplish the charter school’s goals.102 
In sum, because charter school teachers are generally hired at will in 
California, it is unlikely they will be able to establish that they have a 
property interest in their continued employment. While some charter 
school teachers may have other types of employment contracts103 that 
provide a legitimate expectation of job security sufficient to create an 
entitlement under due process, this is largely a deviation from California 
general practice.104 The result is that the federal Due Process Clause is 
unlikely to be an accessible route for charter school teachers to challenge 
or protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions, as they are 
usually unable to trigger the federal Due Process Clause in the first 
place. However, despite generally being precluded from using the federal 
Due Process Clause, charter school teachers may still be able to turn to 
the California Due Process Clause as an alternative path to relief. 
 
 99. See Dore, 139 P.3d at 60–61. 
 100. See Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1989).  
 101. See id.  
 102. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.  
 103. For example, charter school teachers at Green Dot Public Schools, a public charter network in Los 
Angeles, are currently represented by a union. Their employment contract as of 2006 provided that Green 
Dot teachers are not hired at will. Rather, under this employment contract, “No unit member shall be 
disciplined, non-renewed, dismissed, reduced in rank or compensation without just cause.” Agreement 
Between Green Dot Schools, A California Not-For-Profit Corporation and the Association De Maestros 
Unidos/CTA/NEA 16, EDUWONK (effective through June 30, 2006, http://www.eduwonk.com/ 
AMUContractFinalFY20061.pdf; see FAQs: General Questions About Green Dot Public Schools, Green 
Dot Pub. Schools, http://www.greendot.org/page.cfm?p=1751 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 104. See Yeh, supra note 28.  
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III.  California Due Process 
A. Overview of California’s Due Process Framework and Its 
Application to Charter School Teachers 
The California Constitution parallels the U.S. Constitution, providing 
that a “person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”105 However, procedural due process under the California 
Constitution is more inclusive compared to federal due process.106 As 
discussed earlier, “property” under the federal constitution includes both 
traditional forms of property, and an entitlement granted by statute or 
some other legal source.107 California has expressly rejected this narrow 
approach to due process triggers, and adopted its own unique due process 
framework.108 
The California Supreme Court criticized the federal due process 
framework in People v. Ramirez.109 Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, 
agreed that the purpose of procedural due process was to minimize 
abuses of governmental discretion.110 However, the Court rejected the 
notion that only property interests stemming from state law could trigger 
the procedures that protect individuals from arbitrary administrative 
decisions.111 Where administration possesses complete discretion to grant 
or deny an interest, due process is not triggered.112 Because of this 
narrower definition of “property,” Mosk noted that the government 
could essentially carve itself out of the Due Process Clause altogether.113 
Specifically, Mosk was concerned that the government could severely 
limit the scope of the Due Process Clause by providing that the property 
interest at stake is subject to the “unconditional discretion of the person 
in charge of its administration.”114 
The court concluded its critique by stating, “the federal approach 
for determining whether a due process liberty interest is at stake masks 
fundamental values that underlie the clause.”115 Specifically, the 
framework did not promote accuracy and reasonable predictability in 
government decisions, nor did it minimize abuses of governmental 
 
 105. Cal. Const. art I, § 7(a).  
 106. Asimow, supra note 60, at 1085.  
 107. Id. at 1085–86. 
 108. Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 Hastings L.J., 1003, 1014 (2011).  
 109. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (1979). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
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discretion.116 Rather, this framework permitted state legislatures to 
provide administrative agencies with unfettered discretion, and 
ultimately increase the risk that citizens would be subjected to, and 
harmed by, arbitrary decisions.117 
Expressly rejecting the federal due process framework for the 
reasons discussed above, the California Supreme Court established a due 
process framework of its own.118 In doing so, the court attempted not only 
to address the policies underlying the federal due process framework, but 
also to incorporate another unique value: Respect for the dignity and 
worth of each citizen as a human being, each of whom possesses the right 
to be free from arbitrary government decisions.119 The court established 
that even where the governmental decision is discretionary, procedural 
protections may nonetheless be required to protect an individual’s 
dignitary values, or, in other words, to ensure that the method of 
interaction itself is fair in terms of what are perceived as minimum 
standards of political accountabilityof modes of interaction which 
express a collective judgment that human beings are important in their 
own right, and that they must be treated with understanding, respect, 
and even compassion.120 
Accordingly, the court explained that whenever an individual is 
subject to a deprivatory governmental action, that individual possesses a 
due process liberty interest in receiving a fair, unprejudiced decision, and 
must be treated with respect and dignity throughout the process.121 The 
court held that “the due process safeguards required for protection of an 
individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in the context of the 
principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a 
substantive element of one’s liberty.”122 The court established a four-part 
balancing test to determine whether due process is triggered under 
certain circumstances, and what process is due.123 The test requires the 
court to consider: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of that interest if those procedures are used, as 
well as the probable value of additional substitute procedural safeguards; 
(3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, 
and consequences of the action and giving them a chance to present their 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; see Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1016 (“In other words, if one of the purposes of due process 
is to protect individuals from arbitrary government action, then relying on the legislature to create a 
protectable liberty or property interest defeats that very purpose. Indeed, the more discretion an 
agency has, the greater the risk that an agency action will arbitrarily harm an individual.”).  
 118. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 627.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
HomChen-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:28 PM 
August 2016]        CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOL TEACHERS 1753 
side of the story before a responsible official; and (4) the government’s 
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens additional 
procedures would require.124 
The court’s holding in Ramirez is extremely beneficial to charter school 
teachers if interpreted the following way: Even where the government has 
not statutorily conferred to a citizen a right or entitlement, and has complete 
discretion in making a final decision, due process may still be required 
whenever the government takes a deprivatory action, if deemed necessary to 
guarantee respect for that citizen’s dignity and their right to be free from 
arbitrary government actions.125 
The hypothetical introduced earlier, in Part II, where Ms. Apple was 
mistakenly terminated because she was confused with another teacher 
who had poor test scores, clearly illustrates how this different due 
process framework may work to the advantage of charter school teachers 
attempting to challenge an arbitrary or mistaken termination decision. 
Ms. Apple would not have been able to trigger federal due process, as 
she did not possess a property interest or entitlement in her continued 
employment.126 By contrast, under California due process, the fact that 
Ms. Apple has a property interest or entitlement stemming from state 
law is not wholly dispositive of whether due process would be triggered if 
the school chose to discipline or dismiss her. Even if her administrators 
had full discretion to discipline or terminate at any time for any reason, 
as they do under the at will provision in her contract,127 Ms. Apple 
nonetheless possesses the right to be free from arbitrary government 
decisions, according to Ramirez.128 Under this framework, a procedural 
interaction with the decisionmaker would still be necessary to protect her 
dignity as a citizen and human being.129 
Accordingly, if administration did choose to fire Ms. Apple, California 
due process would be triggered.130 Although the government would have 
 
 124. Id. at 627–28.  
 125. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1017 (“On the other hand, Ramirez also appears to state that the 
appropriate inquiry for triggering due process is whether procedural protections are constitutionally 
required based on a balance of the private and governmental interests, rather than on the statutory 
creation of a benefit or interest. In other words, the balance of the interests is ‘separate and independent’ 
from the terms of a statutenot based simply on the interests identified in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). As will be discussed in greater depth infra, this interpretation has not been adopted 
universally by lower courts, and thus undermines whether this doctrine will indeed provide charter 
school teachers with relief from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Id.  
 126. See infra Part II analysis.  
 127. See Cal. Labor Code § 2922. 
 128. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627. 
 129. See Asimow, supra note 60, at 1086.  
 130. Again, this hinges upon whether the courts interpret Ramirez to apply to circumstances in 
which an individual is not deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, as will be discussed later. This 
hypothetical is intended only to illustrate that under the California due process regime, charter school 
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taken a deprivatory action within its discretion, it is still required to respect 
her dignity and right to be free from arbitrary administrative decisions.131 
Subsequently, to properly affect the termination, the administrator would be 
required to provide her with notice of the charges and an opportunity to 
respond.132 And, as discussed earlier, the administrator’s mistake would be 
uncovered during his back-and-forth with Ms. Apple, and the decision 
would ultimately be withdrawn and corrected. Thus, due process would 
have successfully served its purpose in protecting a citizen from being 
subjected to an arbitrary, or in this case mistaken, government action. 
But, as explained in the following Subpart, there are a few unresolved 
challenges that muddle this path to reducing arbitrary disciplinary 
decisions. 
B. Unresolved Issues Undermining the Efficacy of California 
Due Process 
1. Will Due Process Be Triggered Under the Four-Part Test Put 
Forth in Ramirez? 
Thus far, California due process appears to be the most promising 
route for charter school teachers to utilize for protection from arbitrary 
disciplinary decisions. However, there are three hurdles that cast doubt 
on whether this regime will effectively reduce the vulnerability of charter 
school teachers to arbitrary disciplinary decisions. The first is the unclear 
probability that a lower court will interpret Ramirez favorably to find 
that due process has been triggered in the first place. The second issue is 
procedural sufficiency, and what processes precisely ought to be “due” to 
ensure that each teacher’s dignitary interest is respected. Finally, 
assuming that due process was triggered and charter school teachers 
received at least notice and an opportunity to respond, there remains the 
question as to whether procedural protections alone will sufficiently 
protect teachers from arbitrary administrative decisions. Each issue will 
be discussed in turn below. 
Whether the termination of an at will charter school teacher will 
trigger due process depends on two variables. First, of importance, is how 
a court will interpret the California Supreme Court’s ambiguous holding 
in Ramirez. There, the court held that “due process safeguards required 
for protection of an individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in 
the context of the principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative 
procedures is a substantive element of one’s liberty.”133 On the one hand, 
 
teachers still have a chance of benefitting from this legal framework by reducing the likelihood of 
being subjected to an arbitrary disciplinary decision.  
 131. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.  
 132. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 133. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627.  
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some courts interpret Ramirez broadly, such that due process is triggered 
based on the court’s balancing of private and governmental interests, and 
consideration of the arbitrariness inherent in the existing procedures.134 
On the other hand, other courts have interpreted Ramirez very narrowly, 
requiring that the government deprive an individual of a statutorily 
conferred benefit or interest to trigger due process.135 
Under the broad interpretation, due process is not limited to 
deprivations of statutorily conferred benefits.136 California due process 
would still be available to charter school teachers as an avenue to protect 
themselves from arbitrary decisions. Contrastingly, under the narrow 
interpretation, the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher will 
always fail to trigger due process, since charter school teachers’ 
employment does not stem from a statutorily conferred benefit. Thus, 
charter school teachers currently stand at an unresolved crossroads as to 
whether California due process may be triggered when a charter school 
deprives a teacher of his or her employment. The resolution of this issue 
lies in the hands of the lower courts now charged with the responsibility 
of interpreting the Ramirez court’s puzzling holding.137 Regardless, 
charter school teachers may still be able to use this framework, because 
they are not completely blocked from this avenue of relief, compared to 
the federal due process framework.138 
Assuming arguendo, that a court will interpret Ramirez favorably to 
charter school teachers, the second variable that effects the triggering of 
due process under the California framework is whether a court, in 
applying the four-part test laid out in Ramirez, will conclude that the 
balancing of private and government interests, as well as the risks of 
arbitrariness and resulting harm, weigh in favor of imposing due process 
protections.139 The outcome of this test will also resolve the second issue: 
what procedures will be sufficient to respect charter school teachers’ 
dignitary interests.140 Given the circumstances of charter school teachers’ 
employment, it is likely that due process will be required, and that 
charter school teachers will, at a minimum, be given notice of the charges 
 
 134. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1020; see also Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 535–36 (Cal. 
1985) (holding that when procedural due process was triggered, partly because the petitioner did not have 
the opportunity to respond, and because he was not provided with the reasons for the determination, the 
determination was ultimately arbitrary, and due process protections were required).  
 135. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1021; see also Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 
910, 918 (1984) (holding that the language of the Ramirez court suggests that due process is only triggered 
when a statutorily conferred benefit is deprived).  
 136. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1020. 
 137. The issue of whether the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher triggers California 
due process has not been addressed by any California courts.  
 138. See infra Part II analysis.  
 139. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627–28 (1979).  
 140. Id. 
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supporting their termination and an opportunity to respond. The 
following application of the four-part test supports the likelihood of this 
conclusion. 
With regard to the first factor, the interests of the private party, it 
has been recognized that public employees have a great interest in 
maintaining their employment. If dismissed, teachers are not only 
deprived of an opportunity to build their career and make a living during 
the uncertain period in which they are searching for a new job, but they 
also may face difficulties in obtaining subsequent employment, having to 
explain the circumstances of their last dismissal.141 
The second factor concerns the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
that interest if those procedures are used, and the probable value of 
additional, substitute procedural safeguards. Charter school teachers are 
at high risk of an erroneous deprivation of their employment. Because 
charter school teachers are generally hired at will, there are no 
procedures preventing an administrator from following through with a 
mistaken or completely arbitrary dismissal decision. As the regime 
currently exists, an administrator can dismiss a charter school teacher 
because he mistakenly believed her test scores were poor, because he 
misinterpreted her comments at a staff meeting to be horribly offensive, 
or because he simply does not like her.142 The imposition of even minimal 
procedure would be extremely beneficial in reducing the likelihood that 
principals would choose to follow through with arbitrary decisions that 
harm charter school teachers in the process.143 
The third factor, the dignitary interest in informing individuals of 
the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and enabling them 
to present their side of the story, is not recognized at all in the current 
charter school employment regime. Given the nature of at will 
employment, administrators are not required to inform charter school 
teachers of the charges supporting their dismissal, or give them an 
opportunity to present their side of the case in order to avoid potentially 
erroneous dismissal decision.144 
For example, consider the following hypothetical: A teacher named 
Ms. Orange is a four-year veteran at a charter school. Her performance 
 
 141. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (“We have frequently 
recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. While a fired worker may 
find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the 
questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job.”) (citations omitted). 
 142. See At-Will Employment and Wrongful Termination, Governor’s Office of Bus. & Econ. Dev., 
http://www.business.ca.gov/StartaBusiness/AdministeringEmployees/EqualEmploymentOpportunityLaws/ 
AtWillEmployment.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (explaining that at-will employment means, “at 
least in theory, that the employer or employee may terminate the employment relationship at any 
time, with or without cause.”). 
 143. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 144. See At-Will Employment and Wrongful Termination, supra, note 142.  
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has never been questioned, and she is well liked by the other staff 
members, and all of her students. At the end of the school year, Ms. 
Orange is called into the principal’s office. Without warning, the 
principal informs her that her employment contract will not be renewed 
in the following year, because he and the other administrators did not 
believe she was truly invested in the charter school’s mission. 
Here, although the administrators have provided her with a reason 
for her dismissal, there is no way for her to verify that the provided 
reason is not pretextual. There is a possibility that she may have been 
subjected to a completely arbitrary or erroneous decision. This 
hypothetical highlights the lack of respect for teachers’ dignitary interests 
in the charter regime as it current exists. As there is no required process 
and therefore no recognition of charter school teachers’ dignitary 
interests, this factor heavily weighs in favor of requiring at least some 
minimal procedural protections. 
The fourth and final factor concerns the government’s interest, 
which includes the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional 
procedural requirements would entail. Administrators could argue that 
imposing extra procedures on the teacher discipline/dismissal process 
contradicts the central purpose of charter schools. Namely, that charter 
schools were intentionally created to have extra flexibility and to be free 
of the administrative burdens that district schools are subject to, 
including the arduous statutes restricting teacher dismissal and 
discipline.145 Thus, to require administrators to give notice and an 
opportunity for the teacher to respond would impose the bureaucratic 
restrictions that charter schools were designed to avoid, and impede 
administrators’ ability to make staffing decisions immediately, efficiently, 
and flexibly, to best meet their schools’ needs.146 
Though charter schools have an interest in being able to 
immediately discipline and dismiss unsatisfactory teachers, this interest 
does not sufficiently outweigh the other three factors to preclude due 
process from triggering in these circumstances. Requiring administrators 
to comply with only the essential requirements of due processsuch as 
notice and opportunity to responddoes not limit the substantive 
circumstances under which a teacher may be terminated. That is, a 
charter administrator may still dismiss or discipline a teacher for a wide 
range of reasons, compared to a district school administrator who is 
bound by the Education Code. Thus, charter administrators still retain 
great flexibility to make decisions as necessary to serve the school’s 
needs. Furthermore, the fiscal and administrative costs inherent in 
 
 145. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 44932, 44934 (West 2016); see also Human Resources and Employment, 
supra note 9.  
 146. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.  
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requiring an administrator to provide a teacher with notice of the charges 
supporting her dismissal and providing her an opportunity to respond are 
relatively low. These minimal procedural requirements could be met 
efficiently in a variety of ways, such as through a written letter giving the 
teacher notice of the charges and an opportunity to write back within a 
limited number of days, or through a meeting between the teacher and 
administrator.147 
To summarize, assuming that a court interprets Ramirez favorably, 
to apply even when individuals are not deprived of a statutorily 
conferred benefit, the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher 
will still trigger the requirements of California due process. 
Subsequently, to effect dismissal or discipline, administrators would be 
required to give teachers notice of the charges supporting their dismissal, 
and an opportunity to respond. Even minimal due process procedures, 
such as the requirement of a written or oral conversation, sufficiently 
balance the teachers’ right to be free from erroneous or arbitrary 
discipline or dismissal, with the charter schools’ interest in maintaining 
flexible and efficient dismissal procedures. The final question that 
remains is whether requiring administrators to comply with these 
procedural requirements will in fact protect charter school teachers from 
arbitrary disciplinary decisions. 
2. Assuming That Due Process Is Triggered and Minimal Due 
Process Procedures Are Implicated, Will These Procedural 
Requirements Actually Protect Teachers from Arbitrary 
Decisions? 
Under the California Constitution’s Due Process Clause, 
administrators are required to jump through certain procedural hoops to 
properly dismiss a teacher. However, given that charter school teachers 
are hired at will, would requiring administrators to comply with those 
procedures actually reduce the likelihood that charter school teachers 
will be subject to erroneous or arbitrary disciplinary decisions? To better 
illustrate this issue, again consider the Ms. Apple hypothetical discussed 
earlier in Part II of this Note. 
Suppose that in compliance with due process, Ms. Apple’s principal 
provides her with a letter informing her that she is being terminated 
because her test scores are subpar, and that he thinks it is in the best 
interest of the school that a more experienced teacher is hired in her 
 
 147. Procedural sufficiency is yet another variable that would depend on the outcome of the 
court’s application of this four-part test. For the sake of this Note, it can be assumed that minimal 
procedures, similar to those required in the Loudermill case, will be sufficient to serve the purposes of 
due process. It is possible that a court may require higher or lower protections based on a variety of 
other factors.  
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place. Ms. Apple responds in writing, detailing that the test scores cited 
in the principal’s letter actually belonged to another teacher, Ms. 
Applebaum, who also worked at the same school. Upon receiving the 
letter, the principal realizes that he has made a mistake. However, being 
a new administrator who does not want his credibility questioned by 
other school leaders and the rest of his staff, the principal terminates Ms. 
Apple anyway to avoid tarnishing his reputation. Despite the fact that 
the principal has complied with the requirements of due process, Ms. 
Apple is still fired for an arbitrary reason. 
The above hypothetical reveals a gap between the purposes 
underlying procedural due process and the ability of these procedures to 
accomplish their intended goals in the charter school employment 
context. Namely, it calls into question whether the imposition of 
procedural requirements will actually be useful in protecting charter 
school teachers from arbitrary decisions, primarily because of their at 
will employment status. The imposition of procedural requirements still 
imposes no direct restrictions on the reasons, or lack thereof, for which a 
principal can dismiss a teacher. Thus, so long as the administrator first 
complies with the procedures required by California due process, he can 
still discipline or dismiss a charter school teacher for an arbitrary reason, 
or even a mistaken reason, if he so wishes. Fortunately, Justice Marshall 
provides helpful guidance in his dissent in Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, where he addresses a similar critique of the 
effectiveness of procedural due process in reducing the likelihood of 
arbitrariness in administrative decisions.148 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall acknowledges that purely procedural 
requirements could be viewed as “useless act[s]” because a state entity 
“bent on denying employment . . . will do so regardless of the procedural 
hurdles that are placed in its path.”149 He concedes the validity of this 
perspective to an extent. However, he also emphasizes that procedural 
protections ultimately stem from a substantive right of all citizens to have 
a government that acts reasonably and fairly; a government that makes 
decisions based on merit.150 Justice Marshall points out that in vindicating 
this substantive right, “a requirement of procedural regularity at least 
renders arbitrary action more difficult. Moreover, proper procedures will 
surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that results, not from malice, 
but from innocent error.”151 
Ultimately, Justice Marshall counters the argument that procedural 
requirements are completely “useless” by articulating that when the 
 
 148. Roth, 408 U.S. at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
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government is aware that it may have to justify its decisions with sound 
reasons, it is more likely to be cautious, careful, and correct in its 
decisionmaking, even if it possesses discretion throughout the process.152 
He voices that procedural requirements do at least two things: (1) protect 
citizens by reducing the likelihood that the government will act in a truly 
arbitrary fashion; and (2) benefit the government by ensuring that its 
reputation is not tainted by improper or erroneous decisions that 
otherwise go unchecked.153 
Justice Marshall’s analysis in his Roth dissent addresses the concern 
raised by the Ms. Apple hypothetical, to an extent. Indeed, charter 
administrators still possess the discretion to dismiss a teacher for 
completely arbitrary or erroneous reasons, so long as they provide notice 
and give the teacher an opportunity to respond. However, given that 
they are obligated to explain their reasoning to the teacher and/or 
provide a paper trail tracking their dismissal decision, they will be less 
inclined to exercise their discretion so expansively. For example, the 
administrator in the Ms. Apple hypothetical could still fire her after 
discovering his mistake if he is too embarrassed to admit his gaffe to the 
rest of his staff; she is hired at will, after all. However, because the 
administrator is aware of his obligation to inform Ms. Apple that the 
reason for her dismissal is his embarrassment, he may be less likely to 
follow through with that decision. He may decide he would rather not 
deal with the social or reputational consequences of the decisionthat 
his staff and the community would lose respect for him as a school 
leaderor he may not want to put in the effort to find a different, 
legitimate reason for dismissing her. Consequently, while it is possible for 
an administrator to dismiss a teacher erroneously or arbitrarily despite 
being subject to due process requirements and having an opportunity to 
self-correct, the chance of this actually happening is unlikely.154 
In light of the foregoing analysis, California due process appears to 
be the most promising legal doctrine to protect charter school teachers 
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions for several reasons. First, unlike the 
federal framework, charter school teachers are not automatically 
 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. (where Justice Marshall also argues, in essence, that all individuals have a substantive right 
to be employed by the government, and that procedural due process stems from the existence of those 
substantive rights). This Note is not adopting Justice Marshall’s argument in full; rather, only to the 
extent that procedure alone may have a substantial impact on a government’s decisionmaking process, 
and nonetheless protect citizens from arbitrary decisions. 
 154. See Characteristics of Public School Districts in the United States: Results from 2007-08 Schools and 
Staffing Survey, Nat’l. Ctr. For Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009320/tables/sass0708_ 
2009320_d1n_08.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Principals Given Flexibility 
in Firing Teachers Showed They Could Evaluate Well, Study Indicates, Chicago Tribune (July 19, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-19/news/ct-met-cps-study-principals-20110719_1_fire-teachers-
probationary-teachers-principals. 
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precluded from triggering due process, given California’s more expansive 
due process trigger structure. Second, once triggered, due process would 
better protect teachers from erroneous or mistaken dismissal decisions, 
by guaranteeing an opportunity to understand the charges underlying 
their dismissal and to clarify any misunderstandings or mistakes. 
Subsequently, administrators would have an opportunity to self-correct 
and avoid the improper dismissal altogether. Third, although procedural 
requirements would not substantively preclude administrators from 
making arbitrary disciplinary decisions, they will reduce their likelihood 
of occurrence. Administrators may be more hesitant to act upon 
arbitrary tendencies when they are required to create a paper trail and 
provide the teacher with notice of the reasons underlying termination, as 
schools have an interest in maintaining a positive, fair reputation as a 
public employer. 
However, two issues cast a shadow upon whether California due 
process will effectively protect charter school teachers from arbitrary 
disciplinary decisions. The first problem is that the initial application of 
this framework to charter school teachers depends on the way Ramirez is 
interpreted in each particular case. Some courts have interpreted 
Ramirez to establish a separate right to be free from arbitrary 
administrative decisions, regardless of whether a statutory right has been 
conferred. But, other courts have not, and have required the existence of 
a statutory right to trigger California due process. The second 
substantive flaw in this system is that its effectiveness relies primarily on 
the administrators’ good faith. That is, the system operates on the 
assumption that administrators self-correct when mistakes underlying 
dismissal surface, and that administrators are deterred from making truly 
arbitrary decisions as a result of having to comply with the requisite due 
process procedures. While it is reasonable and practical to assume that 
administrators generally will act in good faith, the California due process 
system nonetheless lacks “teeth” in the sense that it is still entirely 
possible that an administrator “bent on denying employment will do so 
regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed in [his or her 
path].”155 
In short, California due process is the most promising bridge for 
charter school teachers to cross in attaining protection from arbitrary 
disciplinary decisions. This framework makes significant headway in 
creating an employment regime that balances not only the charter 
schools’ need to flexibly and efficiently make staffing-related decisions to 
serve its students, but also addresses the teachers’ need to be safe and 
secure from arbitrary and odious dismissal decisions. But, because it is 
wrought by two noteworthy, substantive shortcomings, its effectiveness 
 
 155. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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in shielding teachers from the whim of their administrators remains in 
question. 
With the lessons of Parts I, II, and III in mind, Part IV now proposes 
and evaluates steps that the California Legislature may take to more 
affirmatively protect charter school teachers from arbitrary disciplinary 
decisions, while still balancing the needs of charter schools and the 
objectives of the charter movement. 
IV.  Recommendations for Reform 
The law currently provides charter school teachers with two possible 
routes to protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions: 
unionization and California due process. But, it is uncertain whether 
either route effectively accomplishes the goal of safeguarding charter 
school teachers from arbitrary or erroneous determinations for the 
reasons discussed in Parts II and III respectively. Thus, although charter 
schools largely retain the flexibility to efficiently make staff-related 
decisions to best serve the needs of its students, charter school teachers 
pay the price, as they are still fairly vulnerable to being dismissed for 
arbitrary, odious, or erroneous reasons. 
Meanwhile, district teachers receive significant protection from 
dismissal and discipline via the California Education Code. These 
statutory protections make it nearly impossible for administrators to 
dismiss an ineffective or dissatisfactory teacher absent the most extreme 
circumstances. Consequently, while district teachers enjoy phenomenal 
job security, district schools may be crippled in their ability to best serve 
the needs of their students, given the difficulty inherent in dismissing an 
ineffective, tenured teacher. 
These two employment regimes represent two opposite ends of a 
spectrum, where the competing needs of teachers and schools are not 
being met in a balanced fashion. In each framework, one party benefits 
to the other’s severe detriment. The statutory protections for district 
teachers have recently been challenged through litigation. In 2012, nine 
California public school children challenged the constitutionality of the 
California statutes that govern teacher tenure, teacher dismissal, and 
teacher layoffs, in Vergara v. California.156 Though the challenge failed, 
and statutes still remain in place, this attempted reform, by way of 
litigation, has brought the debate regarding their propriety to the 
forefront of public attention.157 By contrast, however, little advocacy is 
being done on behalf of reform for charter school teachers.  
This Note proposes two suggestions that would better balance the 
charter school teachers’ need to be respected and free from completely 
 
 156. See Medina & Rich, supra note 20.  
 157. Id.  
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arbitrary decisions, with the charter schools’ need to flexibly and 
efficiently make staffing decisions. The first is that California due process 
should be made firmly available to charter school teachers, with 
protections akin to those required in Loudermill. But, a regime of 
administrative review should be layered over these minimal procedural 
protections to ensure that charter school teachers’ substantive right to 
have a government employer that acts reasonably and fairly is properly 
enforced, with requisite procedure playing an integral role. The second 
suggestion is that charter schools should be required to provide teachers 
with full disclosure and training as to its employment policies, and inform 
them of their legal rights as public employees hired at will, or otherwise. 
The details of each proposed reform, the underlying rationale behind 
each proposal, and the anticipated resulting outcomes of said policy 
changes will be discussed in the following Subparts. 
A. Codification of LOUDERMILL-Like Due Process Procedures 
with Administrative Oversight 
Statutory codification of due process protections similar to those 
provided in Loudermill, combined with an additional layer of 
administrative oversight, would serve three key purposes. First, this 
reform would remove one of the barriers that charter school teachers 
currently face in invoking California due process: the uncertainty as to 
whether Ramirez will be interpreted favorably, to afford charter school 
teachers the relief provided by this framework in the first place. Second, 
this reform would provide charter school teachers with reasonable means 
of protecting themselves from erroneous and severely arbitrary 
disciplinary decisions, while still balancing the charter schools’ need for 
flexibility and administrative freedom. Third, requiring administrative 
oversight would address one of the fundamental substantive gaps in the 
California due process framework: the questionable effectiveness of 
procedure alone, when no substantive restrictions are imposed upon the 
administrators’ discretion. 
Statutorily conferring charter school teachers with due process 
protections analogous to those in Loudermill would address one of the 
barriers that they currently face in invoking California due process. As 
discussed earlier, whether the framework applies in the first place is 
dependent upon whether a court interprets Ramirez to require a 
statutorily conferred right. However, should the legislature simply 
provide that charter school teachers may invoke California due process 
even when they are hired at will, this barrier is lifted, because further 
inquiry into courts’ mixed interpretations of Ramirez is no longer 
necessary. Such a reform would be consistent with the fact that 
California uniquely values an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary 
governmental decisions, as illustrated by the court’s rationale in Ramirez. 
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As charter schools are public employers, this right is always at stake 
when a charter school teacher is hired at will in accordance with common 
practice. Moreover, the legislature has provided charter school teachers 
with similar, narrow statutory protections in the past, such as when it 
passed the Rodda Act. In short, this statutory reform would allow 
charter school teachers to invoke due process protections without having 
to rely upon the courts’ mixed jurisprudence on what is required to 
trigger due process under Ramirez. 
Under this proposed framework, school administrators would be 
required to provide their teachers with written notice of the charges 
underlying a disciplinary decision, and teachers would be afforded an 
opportunity to respond. But, the process would not stop there. To ensure 
that the principal is not acting erroneously, or making a completely 
arbitrary decision that does not respect the teacher’s dignitary interest, 
an impartial party would review the written record created between the 
principal and teacher. This administrative review would ideally be an 
impartial panel of individuals, such as a Review Board comprised of 
three to five members of the school board, who could review the paper 
trail to spot-check for arbitrariness or error. Truly arbitrary reasons 
include reasons utterly unrelated to the teacher’s employment. Put 
differently, a reviewing board may find that a teacher might have been 
subjected to an arbitrary disciplinary decision if the underlying reason 
bore no connection whatsoever to his or her role as a teacher.158 
These Loudermill-esque protections, combined with a basic 
framework of administrative oversight, would provide charter school 
teachers with a reasonable means of protecting themselves from 
erroneous or arbitrary disciplinary decisions, while balancing the needs 
and objectives of charter schools. On the one hand, these procedural 
requirements, with additional administrative review, amply respect 
teachers’ dignitary interest and right to be free from erroneous and 
arbitrary decisions. By receiving notice and being provided an 
opportunity to respond, charter school teachers could prevent erroneous 
disciplinary determinations, as factual misunderstandings may come to 
light during the back-and-forth. Moreover, if administrators are aware 
that they must create a written record of their disciplinary decision, they 
may be more hesitant to act arbitrarily, thus reducing the likelihood that 
a charter school teacher will be dismissed for improper reasons. 
 
 158. Assigning a few members of the school board the responsibility of reviewing disciplinary and 
dismissal decisions is ideal for several reasons. First, charter schools are already held accountable to the 
school board, who provides them with the charter that authorizes their existence in the first place. Second, 
school board members are in the best position to review the decisions with an impartial lens, compared to 
actual charter administrators, teachers, or even parents. Finally, allocating this responsibility to school 
board members would be cost-effective; it would be financially and administratively reasonable to 
appoint several school board members to review the paper file of a few decisions each month. 
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More importantly, the additional administrative review would fill 
the remaining gap in the California due process framework: the risk that 
an administrator may still choose to follow through with an arbitrary 
disciplinary decision, regardless of having to comply with procedural 
requirements. If a charter school teacher believes her administrator is 
acting in bad faith, such as by claiming that her dismissal is due to a non-
arbitrary reason when she has reason to believe it is actually motivated 
by an arbitrary reason, she could make these claims in her response to 
the notice of charges. Under California due process as it currently exists, 
her response would only be seen by her administrator, and would have 
little impact on his decision if he is truly bent on ending her employment 
for an arbitrary reason. However, under this new framework, the paper 
trail would be reviewed by a separate, impartial administrative authority, 
who may be more inclined to believe the teacher’s side of the story and 
preclude her termination. Therefore, this framework provides charter 
school teachers protection by imposing procedural requirements and 
providing an opportunity for substantive review. 
These procedural requirements are favorable to both charter school 
teachers, as well as the schools themselves. First, they respect the 
interests of charter schools and the charter movement. Second, they do 
not impose a high fiscal or administrative burden, compared to the 
procedures that district administrators must comply with to discipline or 
dismiss a district teacher. For example, a school board majority vote is 
not required to give the teacher notice of a decision that the 
administrators intend to dismiss or discipline her, and administrators 
need to provide each teacher a full, formal hearing upon request. 
In this framework, a paper trail is established and reviewed; there is 
no need for a hearing, or any other long, drawn-out process that would 
impede the ability of charter administrators to dismiss a teacher 
efficiently. Furthermore, these procedures do not impose a great 
substantive limit upon the reasons that an administrator may dismiss a 
teacher. This reform does not propose that charter school teachers only 
be dismissed for “just cause” or another ambiguous, performance-related 
term, such as “professional misconduct.” Rather, if the Review Board is 
limited to checking for error and true arbitrariness, which may entail 
requiring that the determination rest on something remotely related to 
the teacher’s role as an employee, then charter school teachers can still 
be dismissed for a wide variety of reasons. For instance, under this 
framework, a charter school teacher may be fired if the administration is 
not persuaded she believes in the school’s mission, if she has a poor 
impact on staff culture because she does not get along with the other 
staff, or if her test scores were poor. Therefore, under this framework, 
charter school administrators still retain substantial discretion in their 
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ability to dismiss or discipline unsatisfactory or ineffective teachers at a 
low cost. 
In sum, the codification of Loudermill-like protections with an 
additional level of administrative review would address all of the 
shortcomings inherent in the California due process framework as it 
currently exists. These recommendations also fairly balance charter 
school teachers’ dignitary interest with charter schools’ need for flexible 
and efficient decisionmaking authority. But, these reforms would be 
irrelevant if charter school teachers themselves were not aware of the 
paths of legal relief available to them. The following Subpart proposes a 
solution to this potential issue. 
B. Charter School Teachers Should Be Given Notice of Their 
Rights Related to Their Employment Status 
Charter schools should be required to inform teachers of their legal 
rights under this framework for two primary reasons. First, charter 
school teachers themselves are unlikely to be aware of their rights as 
public school teachers, as a high percentage of those teachers are young, 
inexperienced, and unfamiliar with the profession.159 If charter school 
schools are not required to inform incoming teachers of their rights, 
charter schools may be tempted to take advantage of these unseasoned 
teachers and fire them without complying with requisite procedures. 
Charter schools may also misinform teachers of the law by telling them 
that they have no rights to organize or unionize, when in fact, they are 
afforded this right under the Rodda Act. The teachers would never seek 
redress for their injuries stemming from the charter schools’ misdeeds, as 
they were not aware of their basic rights. To prevent this circumventing 
of the legal system, charter schools thus should provide teachers with 
literature on their rights as public employees and public school teachers. 
Second, as previously discussed, charter school teachers generally 
seek employment at charter schools because they are eager to be free of 
the bureaucratic limitations that burden district schools.160 However, their 
enthusiasm for flexibility and innovation in the classroom often causes 
them to overlook the vulnerabilities that they expose themselves to as at 
will employees. Charter schools thus have a responsibility to be 
transparent with these teachers early on as to the costs and benefits of 
 
 159. See Michelle Exstrom, Teaching in Charter Schools, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures 1 
(2012) (stating that as of 2012, “[t]hirty percent [of charter school teachers] were in their first three years 
of teaching, and 75 percent had taught for less than 10 years.”); see also Sara Rimer, Study Finds Charter 
Schools Lack Experienced Teachers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/08/ 
education/08CHAR.html (“Charter schools, regarded by hundreds of thousands of families as an 
alternative to low-performing public schools, rely heavily on young, inexperienced, uncredentialed 
teachers . . . .”). 
 160. Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26. 
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being employed in this unique workplaceessentially, increased 
flexibility in exchange for less job security. Such transparency would 
actually work to the benefit of charter schools. If teachers are made fully 
aware of their vulnerabilities and legal status as an at will employee early 
on, then they will be less likely to challenge a determination that is valid. 
Consequently, administrators who properly exercise their authority will 
not be burdened by meritless challenges. 
In short, requiring charter schools to provide their teachers with 
notice of their rights and vulnerabilities serves to prevent further 
mistreatment of charter school teachers, and benefits the charter schools 
themselves by lessening the likelihood of complicated dismissals when 
they are, in fact, supported by law. 
Conclusion 
This Note’s survey of the law protecting charter school teachers 
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions has brought several conclusions to 
light. Charter school teachers occupy an odd middle ground between 
public and private employment. Charter school teachers have explicitly 
been carved out of the protections that district teachers receive from the 
California Education Code, as part of the “mega-waiver” designed to give 
charter schools increased flexibility and independence. Consequently, 
charter school teachers are generally hired at will. While they still have the 
right to unionize and eventually pursue better protections through 
collective bargaining, the unionization movement is too young and under-
developed to predict whether it will be effective in improving the working 
conditions for charter school teachers. 
Turning to constitutional protections, charter school teachers, 
though completely precluded from invoking federal due process, may be 
able to invoke California due process to require administrators to comply 
with certain procedural requirements in effecting a termination, which 
may reduce the likelihood that erroneous and completely arbitrary 
reasons will serve as the basis for dismissal. But, because the applicability 
of this framework hinges upon a specific outcome in the wake of muddy 
jurisprudence, it is still uncertain whether charter school teachers will be 
able to turn to this framework for relief. 
The reforms proposed in this Note aim to strike an appropriate 
balance between the interests of charter school teachers on the one hand, 
and the objectives and goals of charter schools and the charter 
movement generally on the other. Statutory codification of Loudermill-
like due process protections, with an extra level of administrative review, 
may provide charter school teachers with reasonable means of protecting 
themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions, while ensuring that 
administrators still retain great flexibility to efficiently dismiss a 
dissatisfactory teacher to best serve student needs. 
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